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DAMs AND LEVEES ARE NOT ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR




The scene sounds like something straight out of New Orleans:
people rescued from the roofs of their houses by helicopter as the water
rapidly rises below; hundreds of thousands ordered to evacuate rapidly
flooding areas;' presidential declarations of natural disaster areas;2
millions of dollars in damages.'
While these descriptions would certainly apply to New Orleans and
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, they actually describe the recent
effects of flooding along the banks of the Susquehanna and Delaware
Rivers in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.4 After fifty years of no significant
flooding,5 the Delaware flooded and caused significant damage to the sur-
rounding areas three times in a two-year period between September 2004
and September 2006.6
Although heavy rains and the remnants of tropical storms and
hurricanes precipitated the floods of 2004-2006, 7 the storms were certainly
* Timothy Kozlowski is a 2008juris doctor candidate at the William & Mary School of
Law. He received a B.A. in History from Rider University in 2005. Timothy would like to
thank the staff and editorial board of the ELPR for their assistance, and would like to
thank his parents, Timothy and Diane, for their continued support.
1 Mark Scolforo, Many Thousands Are Told to Flee Homes in Pa., N.Y, and Maryland,
STAR-LEDGER, June 29, 2006, at 8 (200,000 people ordered to evacuate because of the
threat of rising water).
2 Officials Fear More Delaware Flooding, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES, July 27, 2006,
at Al (natural disaster areas declared in Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia).
' Matt Reilly & Joe Tyrrell, This Routine is All Wet: Residents Assess the Risk of Living
by the River, STAR-LEDGER, July 2, 2006, at 39 (flood damages cased by Delaware flooding
$40 million in New Jersey alone).
'See supra notes 1-3.
5 Officials Fear More Delaware Flooding, supra note 2, at Al.
Tom Hester, Jr., N.J. Farmers to Get Federal Flood Relief State Expanding Buffer Zones
to Ease Toll of Future Damages, N.J. RECORD, Aug. 23, 2006, at A4.
7 Officials Fear More Delaware Flooding, supra note 2, at Al.
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nothing extraordinary like Katrina. The rapid increase in the frequency of
flooding, absent an extraordinary storm like Katrina, has caused environ-
mentalists, and even some public officials, to recognize that there is an
additional significant underlying cause to the recent flooding: overdevelop-
ment in and around existing floodplains. 8As overdevelopment increases,
there are simply fewer places where flood water can go.9 This lack of runoff
space threatens areas already significantly prone to flood damage. °
Of course, with the assistance of federal disaster relief, many
victims of flooding attempt to rebuild." Unfortunately, the federal aid re-
ceived is often insufficient to fully rebuild, and is certainly less than what
would be received from an insurance policy.12 Also, federal disaster relief
cannot prevent future flooding. Furthermore, as Hurricane Katrina so
aptly illustrated, federal money thrown into building projects-such as
reservoirs, dams or levees-is often insufficient. 3
The federal government has recognized that human construction
is not the only means to prevent future flooding. In 1968, Congress passed
the National Flood Insurance Act ("NFIA"). 14 There are two major ways in
8 Steve Chambers & Jeff Whelan, New Rules Good for Rivers, Not So Great for Builders,
STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 23,2006, at 13 (citing comments by environmentalists and New Jersey
Governor Jon Corzine recognizing that overdevelopment has contributed to an increase
in flooding). See also Hal Marcovitz, Bucks Hearing Seeks to Ease Floods, ALLENTOWN
MORNING CALL, July 18,2006, at B1 (quoting (now former) Congressman Mike Fitzpatrick,
who stated that "[d]evelopment in the floodplain puts homes in harm's way.").
9 Brian Scheid, What's Causing Frequent Floods?, THE INTELLIGENCER, June 29, 2006, at
B3 ("As more wetlands, farmlands and river and stream banks are paved over, the amount
of rainfall absorbed is slashed, forcing more storm runoff into rivers, creeks and streams.")
(quoting David Masur, director of PennEnvironment).
'0 Chambers & Whelan, supra note 8, at 13.
" Reilly & Tyrell, supra note 3, at 39. Even though some property owners receive federal
aid, there are many that go without, as statewide damage totals must meet a specified
FEMA threshold. Id.
12 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FEDERAL STAFFORD ACT
DISASTER ASSISTANCE: PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATIONS, ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES, AND FUNDING 3
(Aug. 25, 2005), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33053.pdf [hereinaler
"DISASTER ASSISTANCE"] (funding for individuals and households under the Disaster Relief
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 134 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) capped at approximately $25,000). The $25,000 is intended to cover all of the
following: "uninsured emergency personal needs, temporary housing assistance... home
repair grants, unemployment assistance... debris removal. ... emergency food supplies,
legal aid ... and crisis counseling." Id.
3 Marcovitz, supra note 8, at B1 (five reservoirs with a total capacity of sixty-nine billion
gallons overflowed during the June 2006 flooding).
14 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
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which the NFIA seeks to prevent future flood damage: 1) as the title im-
plies, it provides federally subsidized flood insurance for those in known
flood-prone areas; and 2) in exchange for this federal assistance, partici-
pating communities enact zoning ordinances meant to prevent future flood-
ing.15 Aside from preventing the loss of life and property, one of Congress's
primary concerns was a more pragmatic one: reducing federal expenditures
on flood disaster relief.'6
The focus of this paper is on the second means by which the NFIA
seeks to prevent future federal expenditures caused by flooding: the require-
ment that local communities "adopt adequate flood plain ordinances with
effective enforcement provisions consistent with Federal standards to re-
duce or avoid future flood losses."17 Although federally-subsidized insurance
can help persons recover from flooding after the fact, only by preventing
future construction in flood-prone areas can future flood-related damages
be prevented, or at the very least, lessened.'
8
However, communities by and large have failed to enact such ordi-
nances to prevent future flood-related damages. 9 Although some govern-
ment officials in the areas affected by the Delaware flooding are now
speaking about adopting preventive legislation," history has shown that
such zeal is likely to fade as time passes.21 Regardless, the damage has
already been done in New Jersey; future ordinances will not make the
victims of past flooding whole. Because of this, public officials will gener-
ally focus on securing federal aid to help those affected by floods rebuild.22
15 Id.
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001, 4002 (2000).
'7 42 U.S.C. § 4002 (2000).
18 In addition to overdevelopment, many environmentalists also cite global warming as a
reason for increased flooding. Therefore, even if the overdevelopment problem is remedied,
it is possible that flood-related damages will still increase. Still, correcting part of the
problem is likely to at least slow the rise of flood-related damages. See Scheid, supra note
9, at B3 ("the frequency of major flooding could be signs of the impact of global warming.").
9 See Oliver Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana,
60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 114 (1985) ("the closer one comes to a flooding problem, the harder it is
to make the NFIP work.").
20 Chambers & Whelan, supra note 8, at 13 (describing Governor Corzine's proposal to
double or triple existing no-development zones on New Jersey's waterways).
21 See generally Houck, supra note 19. Despite repeated flood damage having occurred in
New Orleans and surrounding parishes, overdevelopment and failure to abide by FEMA
regulations has continued. Id.
22 See Rep. Holt Presses Bush for Flooding Assistance, US FED. NEWS, July 21, 2006
(reporting on bipartisan effort to get President Bush to authorize emergency assistance
for the communities affected by the June 2006 flooding).
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The problem is exacerbated by the influential development lobby.
Immediately after New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine proposed modest
building restrictions in flood-prone areas, the development lobby began
criticizing the suggestion.23 Whereas garnering federal emergency assis-
tance is viewed positively by all in the community as evidence that their
government officials are taking immediate action, restrictive ordinances
take time to show results and are subject to criticism.24
I. SOLUTION OVERVIEW
Clearly, the NFIA intends for communities to develop sound build-
ing ordinances to minimize the risk of future flood damage.2 ' However,
communities often fail to do so.2' The damage caused as a result is high,
both at the federal level in the form of increased expenditures on disaster
assistance, 2 and at the personal level in the form of extensive property
damage. What, then, is to be done about these two types of damages?
Because communities are required by the NFIA to adopt sound land
use ordinances to protect against future flooding, the courts appear to be
a logical place to seek compliance. There are two potential ways in which
the courts can be used. First, the federal government can use the courts to
bring lawsuits against communities that participate in the National Flood
Insurance Program ("NFIP") but fail to comply with their responsibilities
as stated in the NFIA.2" Second, individual property owners can use the
courts to bring lawsuits against their local governments based on a tort
theory predicated on breach of duty.29
21 See Chambers & Whelan, supra note 8, at 13 (suggesting that the New Jersey develop-
ment community will oppose Governor Corzine's proposed building restrictions; the New
Jersey Builders Association and Builders League of South Jersey refused comment until
the official proposal was published).24 See Houck, supra note 19, at 134.
25 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
26 See generally Houck, supra note 19 (offering a description of four Louisiana commu-
nities and their implementation of the NFIA; includes descriptions of failures to implement
proper ordinances, such as structures being built before the issuance of a permit, as well
as allowing builders to self-certify that they are conforming to floodplain regulations).27 See DISASTERASSISTANCE, supra note 12, at 7-8. See also Charles T. Griffith, Note, The
National Flood Insurance Program: Unattained Purposes, Liability in Contract, and
Takings, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 727, 739 (1994) (stating that federal disaster relief
exceeded one billion dollars per year in the late eighties and early nineties).
2' Houck, supra note 19, at 135-36.
29 Id.
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Of course, both the federal government and property owners have
attempted to use the courts in this manner.3" To date, they have not been
very successful. Ironically, the Fifth Circuit and Louisiana state courts
have made the sound ordinance provision of the NFIA virtually unenforce-
able. In United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
federal government's claim for damages based on a breach of contract
theory.31 In Gabler v. Regent Development Corp., a Louisiana state court
rejected a private cause of action on the grounds that the damage caused
was by "an act of God."32
However, other circuits, such as the Third Circuit that governs New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, are obviously not bound by the Fifth Circuit's
decisions. This paper will discuss avenues of distinguishing the Fifth
Circuit's decisions, or, more drastically, arguments that can be made as to
why the Fifth Circuit's decisions are erroneous and thus should be ignored.
If the other circuits should ultimately choose to align themselves with the
Fifth, the burden would then lie with Congress to amend the NFIA to make
it more enforceable through the judicial system. Of course, any discussion
of amending the NFIA will have to evaluate the political reality of doing
so. Included in this discussion is a debate as to whether it is more advan-
tageous to take federal action by amending the NFIA, or whether it is best
to leave the matter to state and local governments in the hope that they
can formulate effective policies at the local level.
II. ESTABLISHING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' DUTIES UNDER THE NFIA
A. Congressional Intent
At its most basic level, the National Flood Insurance Program,
established by the NFIA, provides subsidized flood insurance for property
owners located within a Special Flood Hazard Area ("SFHA"), colloquially
known as a "flood-zone."33 These flood zones are determined by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") and are published in map form
" See United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1985) (lawsuit by the
federal government against local governments in Louisiana for failing to comply with terms
of the NFIA); Gabler v. Regent Dev. Corp., 470 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (lawsuit by
individuals seeking damages from Louisiana local government for failing to comply with
terms of the NFIA).
3 St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1116.
32 Gabler, 470 So. 2d at 162.
33See 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
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as a Flood Insurance Rate Map ("FIRM"). 34 Before any mortgage or refi-
nancing of a mortgage can occur from a federally-insured lending insti-
tution, a flood determination must be done on the property.3" If the main
structure is located within a flood zone, the property owner is required to
purchase flood insurance.36 This part of the NFIA focuses on property that
is already at risk of flooding.
Other parts of the NFIA also focus on requiring local governments
participating in the NFIP to establish land use ordinances to prevent future
flooding. 37 The text of the NFIA appears to be sufficiently clear in this re-
gard. The original NFIA states that Congress believed that the NFIP could
provide protection against flood losses through the insurance program and
by "encouraging sound land use by minimizing exposure of property to flood
losses."3' The statute also "encourages" local governments to adjust land
use as necessary "to constrict the development of land which is exposed to
flood damage and minimize damages caused by flood losses," and to "guide
the development of proposed future construction, where practicable, away
from locations which are threatened by flood hazards."39
Although the word "encouraged" is somewhat ambiguous, the subse-
quent Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 clearly states that the purpose
of the Act is to "require States or local communities" participating in the
' FloodSmart.gov, http://www.floodsmart.gov/floodsmart/pages/faq-zones.jsp (last visited
Nov. 26, 2007).
35 44 C.F.R. § 59.2 (2006). Generally, the lending institution will hire a flood zone deter-
mination company, as the NFIA allows the lender to hire a third party to make the deter-
mination. See 42 U.S.C. § 4104b(d) (2000). For a list of some existing flood determination
companies, see Flood Zone Determination Companies, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfipl
fzone .shtm (last visited Nov. 26, 2007). It should also be noted that the federal courts have
refused to acknowledge a cause of action against lending institutions that fail to notify
borrowers that their property is located in a flood zone and thus leave the property un-
insured against flood damage. Mid-Am. Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n
of S. Holland, 737 F.2d 638, 638-39 (7th Cir. 1984).
36 See 44 C.F.R. § 59.2. (2006) Areas determined to within a hundred year flood plain are
denoted as "Zone A" on Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) maps. See id. § 59.1 (defining
special flood hazard areas). For areas where the Base Flood Elevation ("BFE") is known,
the BFE is listed on the map and all new residential structures must be elevated above the
BFE. Id. § 60.3(c).
37 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000).
38 Id. § 4001(c).
39 Id. § 400 1(e). Note that this subsection (e) is entitled in part "Land use adjustments by
State and local governments; development of proposed future construction . . ." Id. The
choice of title indicates that Congress intended for the Act to not only provide insurance,
but also that local governments regulate future construction to prevent the necessity of
flood insurance in the first place.
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NFIP to "adopt adequate flood plain ordinances with effective enforce-
ment provisions consistent with Federal standards" in an attempt to pre-
vent future flood damage.4 ° The 1973 Act was passed in response to 1972's
Hurricane Agnes, evidencing what Congress determined was a lack of
enforcement capabilities under the original 1968 Act.4 ' Currently there
are federal regulations that specifically delineate some of the require-
ments of participating communities.42 Furthermore, the fact that part of
the NFIP's purpose is to prevent future flood loss has been recognized by
the Third Circuit.43
B. Failure to Comply
1. Types of Failure, Generally
In his examination of four NFIP-participating communities located
around New Orleans in the 1980s, Oliver Houck describes typical types
of noncompliance.44 Generally, development is weakly regulated; existing
ordinance violations, as well as federally-mandated elevation and flood-
proofing violations, are ignored.4" Although the NFIP allows participating
communities to issue variances for the construction of new buildings within
a floodplain,4 s certain NFIP regulations and procedures must be followed
for the variance to be granted. 47 Generally, noncompliance is blatant. In
one community, instead of issuing an elevation certificate when a building
plan was submitted, as required by the NFIP, the certificate was issued
after the building was already constructed.' In another community, vague
40 Flood Disaster Prevention Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234. § 2, 87 Stat. 975, 976
(emphasis added).
41 See Houck, supra note 19, at 70.
42 See generally 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(b) (2006) (requiring a participating community to use any
available information to determine the BFE of a flood zone). For a less clear requirement,
see id. §60.3(a)(3) (requiring that new construction be "reasonably safe" from flooding).
41 See Pennsylvania v. Nat'l Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 17 n.7 (3d Cir. 1975)
(recognizing that "[a] second objective of the Act... was to encourage the restriction of
development of land exposed to flood hazards" but "[pirocedures designed to implement
this purpose are not ... at issue in this appeal.") (overruled on other grounds).
"Houck, supra note 19.45 Id. at 93.
46 44. C.F.R. § 60.6 (2006).
47 Id.
48 Houck, supra note 19, at 99. Note that the NFIP does not prohibit construction in a
flood zone. However, when construction in a flood zone does occur, the construction must
conform with the base flood elevation level (BFE) to assure that the structure rises above
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regulation language was cited as justification for allowing mobile homes
below the designated elevation. 49 A third community simply authorized
the construction of a shopping center in a known floodway.5 °
2. Allegations of Failure Along the Delaware
Twenty-plus years after Houck's study, it appears that similar
failures occurred in the communities affected by the Delaware River flood-
ing.51 In response to the Delaware floods, the Delaware River Basin Flood
Mitigation Task Force52 recently published a study acknowledging that
communities failed to abide by FEMA regulations.53 Much like the approval
of the shopping center in Louisiana that was constructed in a floodway, the
Task Force, without citing specific examples, found that "new construction
is sometimes improperly permitted."
5 4
The Task Force also found problems with the enforcement of flood-
plain regulations at the local level.5 Disturbingly, the Task Force found
that "[i loodplain managers come from a variety of curricula and back-
grounds" not necessarily related to floodplain management; that many
floodplain managers are only part-time employees; and that the Certified
Floodplain Managers designation issued by the Association of State Flood-
plain Managers are not required to become a floodplain manager.56 The
same under-qualification was found in Louisiana twenty years ago.57 Even
expected flood levels. FEMA, FLOODPLAINMANAGEMENTFREQUENTLYASKED QUESTIONS,
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2092 (March 2007).
9 Houck, supra note 19, at 98.
50Id. at 101. A floodway is part of the flood zone where generally no building can occur.
See DELAWARE RIVER BASIN INTERSTATE FLOOD MITIGATION TASK FORCE, ACTION AGENDA
63 (July 2007) [hereinafter TASK FORCE], available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/Flood
_Website/taskforce/Action-agenda0707/index.htm ("New construction is generally pro-
hibited in floodways because it is unsafe and obstructs the passage of floodwaters." The
floodway is often "the most dangerous area that carries deeper flows and higher velocities.").
51 See generally id. (in proposing a number of measures to lessen flooding along the
Delaware, the Task Force also analyzed what failures regarding floodplain management
may have occurred and subsequently contributed to the recent flooding).
"The members of the Task Force are Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York.
Id. at 7.
5 3 Id. at 63.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 69.
56 Id.
5 Houck, supra note 19, at 109 (discovering that the St. Tammany Parish flood program
was overseen by its Engineering Department, which was comprised of three individuals
252 [Vol. 32:245
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though there has been an increase in flood-related damages, the qualifi-
cations for local government officials in charge of floodplain management
have not improved.
III. ENFORCING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' NFIP RESPONSIBILITIES
THROUGH THE COURTS
Because the NFIA was intended to prevent future flood losses
through sound local building ordinances, an effective enforcement mecha-
nism might be assumed. However, the NFIA only provides one explicit
means of enforcement: suspending noncomplying participating communi-
ties for failure to adopt or enforce adequate regulations.5" This method of
enforcement is insufficient, as FEMA oversight of the program has been
deficient, mostly due to the sheer volume of communities participating.59
Some might argue that providing a judicial remedy against non-
complying communities would be pointless because the NFIP is a voluntary
program from which a community can withdraw at any time.6" However,
allowing either a governmental or private cause of action would still com-
pensate the injured party, whether the federal government or an individual
property owner, who has suffered due either to a community's breach of its
promise to abide by the NFIP or due to a community's negligent implemen-
tation of its duties under the NFIP. Also, it is by no means certain that
municipalities would automatically withdraw if they were exposed to lia-
bility. The federal government offers incentives for participation in the
program which a municipality might decide is worth the risk of liability.6'
who had other duties in addition to floodplain management).
5" 44 C.F.R. § 59.24 (2006).
9 Houck, supra note 19, at 92. FEMA's main source of checking compliance is a one-page
form that each participating community is required to fill out. However, up to twenty
percent of communities in a given year do not fill out the report, and FEMA makes little
effort to collect them. Id. Only about fifteen percent of communities are inspected for
compliance annually by FEMA. Id. at 91-92. See also Griffith, supra note 27, at 748 (noting
the logistical problems of checking in on the 18,000 participating communities, let alone
ensuring that individual building permits conform with NFIP standards).60 FEMA, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NFIP, http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/
intnfip.shtm#11 (last visited Nov. 26, 2007). Although community participation is vol-
untary, the state government may require all communities within it to participate. Id.
61 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2000) (the main benefit provided is obviously the
ability of a community's residents to receive federally subsidized flood insurance). In fact,
part of the reason the program is criticized is because communities receive "all of the carrot,
and little of the stick." Houck, supra note 19, at 88.
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Additionally, the democratic process might cause a municipality to remain
in the program. As members of the public become more aware of a major
flooding problem, they might insist on protection, and thus vote against
any candidate wishing to withdraw from the program. Finally, property
values might come into play. One can imagine a situation where a nonpar-
ticipating community might see its property values decline relative to a
nearby participating municipality.
Undoubtedly, the threat of liability would make a locality more
likely to fulfill its obligations. The goal of providing a cause of action is not
to bankrupt participating communities.62 Rather, the goal is to prevent the
need for litigation in the first place by preventing flood damage. Further-
more, enacting strict land use ordinances regulating building in floodplains
entails little legal risk for communities. Courts have uniformly held that
no unconstitutional taking occurs in this situation. Thus, local governments
do not have to be concerned about compensating property owners under
the doctrine of eminent domain.63
IV. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Contract Cause of Action
"Federal grants authorized by Congress create binding contracts
between the United States and the recipient, and the United States has the
authority to fix the terms and conditions."64 "When Congress acts pur-
suant to its spending power, it generates legislation 'much in the nature
of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with
federally imposed conditions.' ,65 These statements by the United States
62 Even if a community is held liable, the cost could be paid by its liability insurer. However,
the St. Bernard court in dicta seemed to be concerned about the potential for excessive
liability, especially since the federal government was seeking $95 million from the local
communities. United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1985).
' Tex. Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1031-32 (D.D.C. 1978)
('When the government acts to protect the safety and welfare of the community, generally
no taking or appropriation is found. Only unreasonable measures will usually be held to
constitute a taking.") (citations omitted). Unless a plaintiffcan prove that the NFIA oper-
ates to make his land worth close to nothing, the NFIA's land use restrictions are not
unreasonable. See id.
"United States v. Miami Univ., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1142 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (citing Gebser
v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998)).
65 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999) (quoting Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
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Supreme Court imply that if a participating community does not comply
with the NFIP, they may be liable on a breach of contract theory if the
federal government were to bring suit. In fact, early litigation related to
the NFIP suggested that such a theory might be judicially plausible.
In Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, the Third
Circuit stated in dicta that "a second objective of the Act other than to
make flood insurance available to private individuals was to encourage the
restriction of the development of land exposed to flood hazards."6' However,
the court did not reach the ultimate issue of whether there could be local
government liability, because "[pirocedures designed to implement this
purpose [were] not... at issue in this appeal."67 Still, the Third Circuit
seemed to suggest that there might be some judicial mechanism to enforce
the stated purpose of the NFIP.6
Following National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in Texas Landowners v. Harris
decided the issue of whether it was constitutionally permissible for the
federal government to impose sanctions on nonparticipating communities.69
These "sanctions," the plaintiffs argued, occurred in two forms: 1) declin-
ing property values for those living in nonparticipating communities;
and 2) withholding of federal aid from nonparticipating communities.7 °
The court held that such "sanctions" were constitutionally permissible
under the Tenth Amendment,7' and once again indicated the willingness of
the courts to uphold means to achieve the goals of the NFIP. However, the
Texas Landowners court only ruled on an issue relating to nonparticipating
communities.72 The Fifth Circuit was first to rule on whether courts could
provide a remedy against participating but non-complying communities.73
1. United States v. Parish of St. Bernard
In United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, the federal government
brought suit on a breach of implied contract theory against two NFIP-
participating communities in Louisiana based on the communities' alleged
66 Pennsylvania v. Nat'l Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 17 n.7 (3d Cir. 1975).
67 Id.
61 See id. at 19 n.17.
69 Tex. Landowners, 453 F. Supp. 1025.
7 0 Id. at 1028.
7 1 Id. at 1030.
72 id.
71 See United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1985).
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non-compliance with the terms of the NFIP.74 The government argued that
as consideration for federal funds, an NFIP-participating community agrees
to comply with federally imposed conditions, including a duty to enact
proper land use ordinances to prevent future flooding.7" When a commu-
nity fails to comply, the federal government argued, there is a breach of
contract and the federal government is entitled to recover any damages
that result from the breach.76 In St. Bernard, the federal government
sought to recoup the money it spent providing disaster relief that was
required as a result of the defendants' failure to prevent flooding.77
The Fifth Circuit recognized that a statute does not have to explic-
itly authorize a cause of action for one to exist.7" However, despite the
aforementioned purpose of preventing flooding by requiring communities
to adopt sound land use ordinances, the Fifth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision,
overruled the district court and held that nothing in the language of the
NFIP supported the theory that Congress intended for there to be a cause
of action against NFIP-participating communities.79
The majority reached its decision by applying a four-prong test
used previously by the Fifth Circuit in Till v. Unifirst Federal Savings
& Loan Ass'n"° to determine whether there was a cause of action under
a statute if one was not explicitly provided for by Congress.8 The four
prongs, initially enunciated by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash,82 were:
1) "whether the plaintiff is one for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted"; 2) "whether there is an indication of legislative intent to create
or deny such remedy"; 3) "whether such a remedy would be inconsistent
with the underlying legislative purpose"; and 4) "whether the cause of
action is one traditionally relegated to state law."8 3
In his dissent in St. Bernard, Judge Williams stated that he would
have found a breach of contract because the participating communities
failed to implement and enforce specific land ordinance requirements as
74 Id.
7 See id. at 1121.
76 See id.
77Id. at 1119.
78 See id. at 1122.
79 See id. at 1122-23.
o Till v. Unifirst Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1981).
81 St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116 at 1122.
82 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
' St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1122.
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mandated by participation in the NFIP.' Instead of using the Till test, he
would have applied the principle that it is an "inherent right" of the fed-
eral government to sue for breach of contract when it attaches conditions
to a grant of federal assistance.85
2. Developments Since St. Bernard
The federal government has not pursued a contract cause of action
to enforce the NFIP since St. Bernard; thus, no other circuit has had the
opportunity to revisit the Fifth Circuit's holding. In fact, there has been
surprisingly little comment on St. Bernard in other court opinions. One
court that did comment on St. Bernard was the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio in United States v. Miami Univer-
sity. 6 In a suit brought by the federal government, the court was faced
with the issue of whether the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
("FERPA") created a binding contract between the government and grant
recipients. 7 The defendants sought to rely on St. Bernard for the propo-
sition that any conditions bringing rise to a federal cause of action must
be "unambiguously stated."8 However, the court quickly distinguished
St. Bernard on a factual basis, stating that the Fifth Circuit merely found
that there was insufficient evidence to hold that a contract existed be-
tween the federal government and the participating communities. 9 In the
present case, the court held that, although there was no express provision
of a contract, the terms of FERPA created "clear and unambiguous obli-
gations and restrictions on fund recipients, and thus a 'contract'... was
created."9 ° Obviously, it was not the district court's place to expressly reject
St. Bernard's holding, as neither the location nor context were the same.
However, if the federal government were to try again, another court could
reach the same conclusion as the Southern District of Ohio in a NFIP con-
text by stating that the terms of the NFIP create "clear and unambiguous' 
1
obligations and restrictions on the participating communities, thus creating
a contract.
84 See id. at 1129 (Williams, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 1128.
86 United States v. Miami Univ., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1143 n.8 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
87 Id. at 1141-42.
' Id at 1142 n.7.
89 Id.
90 1d. at 1142.
91 Id.
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3. Other Ways to Distinguish St. Bernard
a. Strict Construction
A key feature of the St. Bernard decision is that the Fifth Circuit
majority clearly relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash.92
In that case, the Supreme Court began its trend of limiting a plaintiffs
ability to bring suit on an implied contract theory.93 The Fifth Circuit's
decision is clearly one of strict statutory construction. A differently com-
posed court in another circuit may decide to interpret the NFIA differently:
Furthermore, it can be argued that the St. Bernard court erred by placing
the federal government on the same standing as ordinary plaintiffs. If a
court was concerned about opening the door to implied causes of action, it
could merely assert that there were policy reasons to allow the government
greater leeway in bringing a suit based on an implied cause of action. Of
course, as the St. Bernard court argued, a community must have notice
that it has entered into a contract.94 Here the obvious counter-argument
is that participating communities have constructive notice based on their
obligations under the act.
b. The Cort v. Ash Test
Another circuit, wanting to keep with the Cort v. Ash tradition,
could merely interpret the Cort test differently and reach a contrary
result.9" The first and third factors, whether the plaintiff is a member of
the class for whose benefit the statute was created and whether a private
right is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme,
seem to come out determinatively in favor of the federal government. Addi-
tionally, at least one federal circuit has recognized that the Supreme Court
has moved towards a more holistic analysis of legislative intent rather
than adhering strictly to the four Cort factors.96 As such, the first and third
92 St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1122.
" See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
9 St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1121.
95 The St. Bernard court only analyzed the issue of whether there was a legislative intent
to create a private right of action. Again, the court was extraordinarily contextual, and
finding nothing specific in the language of the statute or the legislative history, decided
there was no legislative intent to provide for a cause of action by the federal government
against a participating community. St. Bernard, 756 F.2d at 1122-23. However, the court
only examined the history of the 1968 Act as support for its conclusion, and did not examine
the 1973 Act. See id. at 1122-23 n.7.9 Mid-Am. Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n of S. Holland, 737 F.2d 638,
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Cort factors could be held to be dispositive, or, at the very least, highly
persuasive, in determining the outcome of the second factor.9" Thus, if the
first and third factors are present, it is likely the second factor is present
as well; therefore, three of the four Cort v. Ash factors would be met.98
The federal government, as plaintiff, clearly intended to benefit from
the statute, because one of the main reasons the NFIA was enacted was
to lessen federal expenditures spent on flood-related damages.99 Further-
more, a breach of contract remedy is not inconsistent with this federal
purpose. Putting communities on notice that they must comply or face
liability would certainly lessen federal expenditures. The second factor,
whether there is an indication of a legislative intent to create such a
remedy, can be supported by the 1973 Act, where Congress clarified the
responsibilities of participating communities. °
On the other hand, one could also argue that Congress had the
opportunity to provide a private right of action but chose not to do so. The
best argument against inferring a cause of action is that the NFIA pro-
vides for access to the courts in certain specific instances. For example,
Section 4053 allows NFIA insurance policyholders to sue their insurers in
federal court, 1 ' and Section 4104(g) allows those objecting to designation
of an area as a flood hazard to bring an action in federal court seeking a
redesignation. 02 Still, an argument could be made that perhaps Congress
felt a private right of action was already implied under general contract
principles. The fourth prong of the test-whether the claim is one tradi-
tionally assigned to state law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
claim based on federal lawl° 3-also appears to be satisfied. A suit by the
federal government against a state over a federal matter, in this instance
the NFIA, is a matter not generally assigned to state law.10 4
639-40 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[in these more recent cases the Supreme Court has focused on
a comprehensive analysis of legislative intent instead of explicitly following the point-by-
point Cort analysis.").
" Id. at 640 ("the first and third Cort factors are intimately related to the question of
legislative intent... [plursuant to this development the second Cort factor-legislative
intent-is the crucial issue, to be resolved in light of the statutory language, legislative
history, and legislative purpose.").
98 Id.
99 42 U.S.C. § 4001, 4002 (2000).
100 Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975.
101 42 U.S.C. § 4053 (2000).
102 42 U.S.C. § 4104(g) (2000).
103 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
104 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
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B. Tort Cause of Action
1. Gabler v. Regent Development Corp.
In Gabler v. Regent Development Corp., twenty-two plaintiffs filed
a tort cause of action against the Regent Development Corporation, and,
importantly, against the parish of Jefferson, Louisiana and its liability
insurer." 5 The plaintiffs theory of the case was that the parish negligently
approved the construction of a subdivision despite the fact that the area
would be exposed to a significant risk of flooding.0 6 The Louisiana state
trial court initially ruled for the plaintiffs; the issue on appeal concerned
whether the defendants were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' inju-
ries.'0 7 Defendants relied solely on an "act of God" defense.1
0 8
In its opinion, the Louisiana Court of Appeals cited varying defi-
nitions of what constitutes an "act of God." Ultimately, the court noted that
the most clear definition of an act of God is a definition that defines what
is not an act of God: "[a]n act which may be prevented by the exercise of
ordinary care is not an act of God."'0 9 The court then concluded that 13.5
inches of rain falling within a twenty-four hour period did indeed amount
to an act of God.110
However, the court acknowledged that not every act of God relieves
a defendant of liability."' The court stated that "[wihen an 'act of God'
combines or concurs with the negligence of a defendant to produce an
injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but
for his own negligent conduct or omission."" 2 Based on the facts of this
particular case, the court merely held that the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff would have occurred no matter what precautions were taken." 3
or which shall be made, under their Authority... to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party .... ").
105 Gabler v. Regent Dev. Corp., 470 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
10 6 Id. at 150.
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2. Cases Since Gabler
The state court Gabler decision has been followed by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana."4 In Beahm v.
Groike,"5 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to alert him that
the property he was purchasing was in a flood plain. Much like in Gabler,
the defendant argued that the event causing the plaintiffs damages was
an "act of God"; thus the plaintiff would have suffered damage regardless
of whether he knew that the property he was purchasing was in a flood-
plain. 116 Citing Gabler, the court held that "[elxcessive rains, floods, and in-
undations have long been considered acts of God," and that the flood in the
present case was also an act of God." 7 Because most damages alleged to
stem from NFIP violations will likely involve heavier-than-normal rainfall,
reliance on Gabler creates a significant hurdle. Plaintiffs must somehow
prove that an extraordinary weather event was not an act of God. Perhaps
one course of action for plaintiffs would be to cite the recent frequency of
"extraordinary" weather events in order to prove that they are no longer
extraordinary.
As stated in Gabler itself, however, existence of an act of God is not
a complete bar to liability for negligent actions during a flood."' In Saden
v. Kirby,"9 a group of homeowners sued the New Orleans Sewage and
Water Board and Planquemines Parish for injuries suffered during a
storm in which ten to twelve inches of rain fell over a twenty-four hour
period. 20 The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's de-
termination that the storm was an act of God.' 2 ' Nonetheless, the court
stated that when an "'act of God' combines or concurs with the conduct
of a defendant to produce an injury, the defendant may be held liable for
any damages that would not have occurred but for its own conduct or
omission."'22 Because the plaintiff s expert was able to convince the trial
.. See Beahm v. Groike, No. CIV.A. 98-1214, 1999 WL 13939 (E.D. La. 1999).
115 Id.
116 See id. at *3. In this instance, the frequency of the rainfall experienced was estimated
to occur once every 500 to 1,600 years. Id. at *1.
117 Id. at *3-*4.
118 Gabler, 470 So. 2d at 152.
119 Saden v. Kirby, 660 So. 2d 423 (La. 1995).
120 Id. at 424-26. Plaintiffs claimed that the Sewerage and Water Board was negligent in
not repairing a water pump in the months leading up to the storm, and that the parish was
negligent in its construction of an emergency dam. Id. at 424.
121 Id. at 427.
122 Id. at 428.
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judge that the actions of the Sewerage and Water Board led to an addi-
tional three inches of flooding, the judgment granting plaintiffs' recovery
was affirmed.'23
3. Ways to Distinguish Gabler
Gabler certainly implies that a tort cause of action is available
against a community that negligently enforces its ordinance requirements.
Furthermore, in Saden, the court appeared to have little trouble deter-
mining that the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board had a duty to
fix a faulty water pump, and that the failure to do so in a timely manner
resulted in a breach of that duty." Similarly, a plaintiff could argue that
a NFIP-participating community's failure to enforce the program's require-
ments constitutes a breach of duty to affected members of the community.'25
Because the only issue on appeal in Gabler was proximate causation,
it can be inferred that the trial court found that the other elements of a tort
claim were met: duty, breach of duty, and actual injury. Thus, a potential
tort claim against NFIP-participating communities for failure to comply
with the terms of the program would look something like this: by joining
the NFIP the community undertakes a duty to protect its citizens by enact-
ing ordinances designed to prevent future flood damage; upon breach of
this duty, according to some standard of negligence, the property owner
suffers actual damage (generally not an issue) that was proximately caused
by the breach.
Because a tort action is generally a state common law claim, it is
state law that would determine the standard of negligence.'26 Depending
on the jurisdiction, the violation of a federal statute may be considered
either as evidence of negligence, or even negligence per se.'27 A court likely
'
23 Id. at 429. The case was then remanded to the state district court for trial on damages.
Id. at 431.
124 Id. at 430.
125 See Hofbauer v. Nw. Nat'l Bank of Rochester, 700 F.2d 1197, 1201 (8th Cir. 1983)
(dismissing an action brought under the NFIA on the basis that the plaintiff was not a
special class for which the Act was enacted to protect; however, the court acknowledged
that a violation of the Act could give rise to a common law negligence claim but left it up
to the state courts to make the determination for themselves).
2' See Callahan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 3:06CV/05 RV/MD, 2006 WL
1776747, at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 26, 2006).
127 See id. The merits of this case were not at issue in this proceeding, as the court was
only considering whether to grant a motion appealing the removal of the case from state
to federal court. Id. at * 1. Ultimately, the case was dismissed because the court held that
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would view a violation of the NFIP as mere evidence of negligence. Holding
a violation of the NFIP to be negligence per se would stretch the purpose
of an act that does not specifically provide for a private cause of action. 121
As illustrated by Gabler, Beahm, and Saden, the issue of proximate
causation is a difficult barrier for plaintiffs. 129 Any local government facing
suit will almost certainly use an "act of God" defense. However, Saden
showed that it is possible for a plaintiff to recover even if an act of God is
alleged. 3 ° To do so, the plaintiff must establish that the acts of the defen-
dant contributed to the damage beyond what would have been caused by
the act of God alone.' As was the case in Saden, overcoming the act of God
defense almost certainly requires an expert. 3 2 A class action similar to the
one brought in St. Bernard'33 would assist in defraying the cost. Obviously,
the mere presence of an expert would not guarantee that the finder of fact
would determine that at least some of the damage was caused by the par-
ticipating community's negligence. For instance, in Saden, while the trial
judge accepted the expert's determination that the Sewerage and Water
Board caused additional damage, the judge sided with the defendants'
expert in determining that the parish did not cause additional damage
in their construction of an emergency dam.'
4. Other Decisions on a Private Right of Action
The case of Segall v. Rapkin, which arose in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, is also troubling for
private plaintiffs seeking to hold NFIP-participating communities liable
for non-compliance. '35 In that case, the defendant had been subcontracted
to conduct a BFE study for the town of Clarktown. 136 The court applied
the general rule that if "congressional intent cannot be inferred from the
the insurer owed no duty to the individual homeowner to conduct a correct flood zone deter-
mination. Callahan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 3:05CV105/RV/MD, 2006 WL
2993178 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2006).
128 See Callahan, 2006 WL 1776747 at *2.
129 See Gabler v. Regent Dev. Corp., 470 So. 2d 149, 152 (La. Ct. App. 1985).; Saden, 660
So. 2d at 423; Beahm v. Groike, No. CIV.A. 98-1214, 1999 WL 13939 (E.D. La. 1999).131 Saden, 660 So. 2d at 428.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 United States v. Parish of St. Bernard, 756 F.2d 1116, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985)
134 Saden, 660 So. 2d at 431.
131 Segall v. Rapkin, 875 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
136 Id. at 241.
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language of the statute.., and no other source of intent exists, a private
right of action cannot be implied." 37 However, the court did not conduct
an extensive inquiry into the matter, neither citing St. Bernard nor con-
ducting an in depth analysis of the Cort v. Ash factors.13' Rather, while
acknowledging that a stated purpose of the act was to limit flood damages
by enacting proper land use regulations, the court stated that "[i]t is not
necessary for private parties to have a right of action under the Act to
achieve or further its purposes."39
Like the cases previously cited, Segall is distinguishable. First,
Segall involved a claim against the subcontractor that did the BFE study,
not the community itself."14 In this context, the court explained that to allow
for a private right of action would discourage the purpose of the NFIA be-
cause subcontractors would be wary of undertaking the job of conducting
the BFE studies required by the NFIA.' Furthermore, the court cited the
rule of law that no private cause of action can exist for a breach of duty by
a government contractor for violating the principal's statutory duties, in
this case, the community's. 42 Therefore, a proper reading of Segall is that
no private cause of action exists under the NFIA against a private party
engaged in activities required by the NFIA.' Unfortunately, the Southern
District did not make this clear. However, it seems obvious that the court
was concerned about holding private parties liable under the NFIA, and
did not consider whether a private cause of action could exist against the
local community.' Most importantly, Segall only discussed whether a
private cause of action existed under the statute; the court did not discuss
137 Id.
138 See id. at 240-41.





4 See Virgin Islands Tree Boa v. Witt, 918 F.Supp. 879, 902 (D.V.I. 1996) (believing the
holding in Segall to be that the "NFIA creates neither an express nor implied private cause
of action for homeowners to sue government contractors for errors in the contractors' flood
insurance studies."). In Witt, the federal district court for the Virgin Islands held that the
NFIA created no implied right of action against FEMA itself. Id.
14 See Segall, 875 F.Supp at 240. Even if a future court rejects the argument that the
NFIA intends that individual communities be held liable, its holding can at least be
limited to federally-insured lending institutions based on its use of limiting language. Mid-
Am. Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. First Savs. and Loan Ass'n of S. Holland, 737 F.2d 638, 643
(7th Cir. 1984) ("Absent any indication that Congress intended a federal cause of action
in favor of borrowers against lenders... this Court is not in a position to create such a
cause of action.") (emphasis added).
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whether failure to comply with the terms of the NFIA could be used as the
basis for a negligence claim.'45
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Mid-America National Bank of
Chicago v. First Savings & Loan Ass'n of South Holland, while reaffirming
the notion that private parties are not intended to be liable under the NFIA,
suggests in dicta that perhaps individual communities were intended to
be liable.'46 In that case, the Seventh Circuit held that federally-insured
lending institutions were not liable under sections 4012a(b) and 4104a of
the NFIA to borrowers who were not informed that their properties were
located in flood zones and thus were uninsured against flood damages. 47
Despite the statutory duties apparently placed on lenders, the court ruled
that the "statutory scheme of the Flood Program reveals no indicia of legis-
lative intent to create an implied federal cause of action under Sections
4012a(b) or 4104a."1' The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the primary pur-
pose of the NFIA "was to diminish, by implementation of sound land use
practices and flood insurance, the massive burden on the federal trea-
sury of escalating federal flood disaster assistance."149 Therefore, the court
reasoned that absent an express cause of action, no implied cause of action
should be read into those sections of the NFIA because the federal govern-
ment can achieve its objectives based on its oversight of federally-insured
lending institutions. 5 ° Thus, if a federally-insured lender fails to properly
require a borrower to purchase flood insurance, federal institutions such
as the FDIC could impose sanctions on the non-complying banks.' 5 '
A plausible reading of Mid-America is that the court was unwilling
to provide for a federal cause of action because the federal government
itself had the ability to police non-compliance. This argument falls flat
141 See Segall, 875 F.Supp. at 240.
146 See generally Mid-Am., 737 F.2d at 642.
147 Id. at 640. Section 4012a(b) prohibits federally-insured lending institutions from
issuing a loan for a property located in a flood zone unless flood insurance has been
purchased. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2000). Section 4104a requires the lending institution
to notify prospective borrowers that the property is located in a flood zone at a reasonable
time prior to the closing of the loan. 42 U.S.C. § 4104a (2000).
14'Mid-Am., 737 F.2d at 642.
'
49 Id. But see Tex. Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1033 (D.D.C.
1978) (stating that the goal of the NFIA is one of "protecting property owners ... against
flood damage resulting in 'personal hardships and economic distress which have required
unforeseen disaster relief measures and have placed an increasing burden on the
Nation's resources.'") (quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added)).
150 See Mid-Am., 737 F.2d at 642.
151 See id.
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when considering a private suit against a non-complying community.
The only policing power the federal government has over a non-complying
community is the ability to suspend it from the program; for reasons dis-
cussed supra, this means of policing is ineffective and inefficient. Given that
one purpose of the NFIA is getting communities to adopt sound regulations
to prevent flooding and federal disaster expenditures, the federal govern-
ment's ability to police participating communities should be at least as strong
as its ability to police peripheral participants such as lending institutions.
Thus, if courts are steadfast in their refusal to permit the federal
government to bring a cause of action against participating communities,
the only other way to ensure compliance with the NFIA is to allow private
citizens to bring suit. Otherwise, it is a stretch of the imagination and strict
constructionism to state that Congress intended for such a comprehensive
program as the NFIA to remain virtually unenforceable. Admittedly, there
may be too much momentum against the existence of a private cause of
action for most courts to be willing to allow such a suit.'52 Although many
of the cases refusing to recognize a private right of action may be distin-
guishable, it is easier for a court to hold that if Congress intended for a
private cause of action, it would have explicitly provided one.'53
V. WHY AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION IS THE BEST SOLUTION
Opponents of an implied cause of action have some valid arguments
for their position. Congress did have the opportunity to provide an express
cause of action, yet failed to do so. Furthermore, nothing is preventing
Congress from amending the statute. Also, a new federal cause of action
would obviously increase litigation, and thus, even if they were not liable,
communities would have to budget for increased litigation costs, drawing
money away from important services. Instead of spending money on liti-
gation, the argument goes, homeowners should use the political process
to encourage communities to spend their funds at the local level to try and
solve the problems associated with flood-related damages.
152 See, e.g., Ford v. First Am. Flood Data Serv., Inc., slip op., No. 1:06CV00453, 2006 WL
2921432, at *3 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (in an action against a flood determination company for
conducting a faulty determination, the court granted the company's 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim by relying on the fact that an "overwhelming majority
of both federal and state courts refuse to allow either private federal or common law
claims arising out of violations of the Act.").
153 Id. at *7.
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However, even if an implied cause of action-either by the federal
government or by individual citizens-against non-complying communities
is not a perfect option, it is likely the most effective option. Congress has
not traditionally been proactive about solving the problem of flood-related
damages, choosing rather to take on the matter after-the-fact. Furthermore,
despite some encouraging signs, history has shown that communities are
unlikely to be able to solve the problem on their own, due both to amount
of cooperation required and the difficulty in maintaining political will.
A. Challenges in Amending the NFIA
If the courts refuse to grant a cause of action based in some form
on the NFIA, Congress could always amend it to explicitly provide a cause
of action against communities that participate in the program but fail to
abide by its requirements. Such a cause of action could take two forms.
First, Congress could provide for a cause of action on behalf of the federal
government against participating communities that fail to fulfill their obli-
gations, similar to the cause of action rejected in St. Bernard. Second,
Congress could allow suit to be brought by injured residents against their
respective NFIP-participating communities if the communities have failed
to fulfill their obligations under the program.
However, either proposal would likely face an uphill battle. While
providing the federal government a cause of action would likely survive
any legal challenge, it would face significant political opposition, especially
from the development lobby.154 An amendment allowing for a citizen suit
would not only face the same political pressure, but would also face legal
challenges based on federalism concerns.
Furthermore, history illustrates the difficulties in overcoming polit-
ical opposition to amending the NFIA. For example, one author writing in
1992 suggested that Hurricane Andrew "should serve as a wake-up call
to Congress that the NFIP's problems must be tackled immediately."155
However, proposed amendments in the fall of 1992 passed the House but
M See Griffith, supra note 27, at 742. When Congress does act regarding the dangers of flood-
ing, it is usually in favor of the development lobby, such as the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1977 which allowed communities that do not participate in the NFIP
to remain eligible for federally assisted housing financing. Id.
155 Id. at 740. Prophetically, the author predicted that Congress was lucky it had a chance
to act after Hurricane Andrew because at least it "managed to miss major low-lying
metropolitan areas such as New Orleans." Id. at 741.
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failed in the Senate. 5 6 Again, the development lobby proved to be highly
influential."15
B. Problems with Relying on Local Communities
Based on the difficulty of amending the NFIA to provide a cause
of action, if an alternative can be found, it should certainly be pursued.
Although much of this paper has been critical of local governmental enforce-
ment of floodplain regulations, there is some evidence that local awareness
of the problem is increasing."5 8 As people grow tired of suffering flood-
related losses, it is logical to believe that they will demand that local and
state officials improve the situation. Despite some local governments' his-
torical failure to fully perform their duties under the NFIP, political pres-
sures might finally be causing them to pay closer attention to the problem.
The Delaware River Basin Flood Mitigation Task Force is a good
first step and suggests that perhaps local and state governments can rem-
edy the problem on their own initiative. For instance, the Task Force actu-
ally recommended more stringent regulations concerning construction
around floodways than those required by the NFIP.R "9 In addition, the
Task Force recommended that communities within the Delaware River
Basin adopt the Association of State Floodplain Managers' (ASFPM) "No
Adverse Impact" approach. 6 ° This approach "ensures that the actions of
one property owner or a community do not adversely impact the properties
and rights of other property owners."'6'
Recommendations such as those made by the Task Force are more
responsive to the needs of local governments. Instead of a "one-size-fits-
all" approach, once state and local governments decide to fix the problem,
they can tailor their regulations to their unique circumstances. Of course,
this assumes that local governments are aware of the problem and believe
that they are the ones who should fix it. As noted by the Task Force, each
of the Delaware River Basin's 838 communities must meet, discuss, and
agree to conform their local regulations to consistent standards if the Task
'
56 Id. at 728 n.6.
157 See id. at 764.
See generally TASK FORCE, supra note 50.
159 Id. at 63. The federal standard allows for a one foot rise in flood depths in determining
floodways; the more stringent standard would allow for only a 0.2 foot rise. Id.
160 Id. at 45.
161 Id. at 66.
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Force's recommendations are to be implemented and be effective. 162 In addi-
tion, history raises a legitimate question as to whether the Task Force's
recommendations will ever be adopted, and more importantly, whether
they will actually be enforced.
Clearly, multi-government cooperation is necessary for any effective
change. As the Task Force noted, "development may be occurring in the
floodplain of one State or community that may be adversely affecting other
States and communities. Development in the floodplain ... results in
adverse impact somewhere...,"163 Obviously, one of the key barriers in
getting communities to agree to solutions is the cost associated with adopt-
ing them. In recommending that the communities within the Delaware
Basin re-map their flood zones, the Task Force recognized that the FEMA
Map Modernization Funds are not sufficient and that the states compris-
ing the Task Force must contribute funding to cover the cost.'64 The Task
Force noted that it is of critical importance that NFIP mandates continue
to be fully funded by Congress.'65
C. A Judicial Remedy Is the Best Remedy
Instead of waiting, perhaps endlessly, for local governments to reach
agreement as to what actions should be taken, or for Congress to amend the
NFIP, a federal cause of action would provide a much more direct incen-
tive for individual communities to abide by NFIP regulations. Even if com-
munities are now more willing to solve the problem, an implied cause of
action would give them the impetus to maintain their newfound resolve,
and would also give them ajustification for not bowing to the pressures of
the development lobby.
CONCLUSION
Hurricane Katrina caused billions of dollars in damages'66 and
contributed to the deaths of at least 1,710 people.' 6 ' Obviously, not all of
162 Id. at 68.
163 Id. at 66.
'64 Id. at 60.
165Id.
166 Michael Kunzelman, State Farm Settles in Katrina Damage Suit, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
2007, at D2.
'
67 Wil Haygood, Scattered by Katrina, Linked by a Church; Pastor and his Wife Keep Tabs
on Their Far-Flung Flock, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2006, at Al.
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the damage and death caused by Katrina was due to noncompliance with
the NFIP. However, Katrina did illustrate the type of destruction and chaos
flooding can cause. It also showed that physical barriers, such as dams
and levees, are insufficient to prevent flooding. The NFIP was intended to
complement such physical measures in an attempt to prevent, or at least
mitigate, flood-related damages. Unfortunately, it seems that every time
a major weather event occurs, whether it be in the Gulf Coast or along the
banks of the Delaware, the failure of the NFIP is apparent. Flooding con-
tinues, federal expenditures increase, and families attempt to rebuild only
to still be at the risk of future flood damages.
The NFIP's failure should not come as a surprise because there
is no method of enforcement except suspension from the program itself.
Suspension from the program is insufficient as a means of enforcement
because it allows local governments to keep past benefits from the program
without fulfilling their obligations. It is as if a party to a contract could
intentionally breach and walk away from his obligations. While the breach-
ing party may not get his intended benefits, in this case federal aid, the
injured party also receives nothing. Of course, contract law does not work
this way. An injured party receives some measure of damages. Yet, in this
instance, the injured party in the contract, the federal government, has no
recourse. Similarly, when a private party undertakes a duty, by virtue of
contract or otherwise, breaches that duty, and injures those intended to
benefit from the contract, the injured parties receive damages. Yet, in this
instance, the intended beneficiaries, members of a flood-prone commu-
nity, have no recourse against the local governments who undertook a duty
to enact sound land use ordinances. The most frustrating aspect of this
scenario is that allowing for either or both causes of action would imme-
diately make the NFIP a more effective program for mitigating future
flood damages.
Courts are rightfully wary of recognizing new implied causes of
action. However, courts have recognized implied causes of action in other
contexts where it was clear that a cause of action was justified by the pur-
pose of a statutory scheme. For instance, the Supreme Court has read into
Title IX an implied private cause of action against educational institutions
that receive federal aid but do not comply with the requirements for re-
ceiving that aid. 6 ' A similar line of reasoning is available for the Court
in the context of the NFIP. Of course, it would be helpful in bringing the
issue before the Supreme Court if one of the Courts of Appeals expressly
168 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's St. Bernard decision. Despite the fact
that most of the existing case law seems to oppose any cause of action under
the NFIP,'69 courts, including the Supreme Court, are not insulated from
current events, and hopefully will realize that the NFIP as currently inter-
preted does not fulfill either its purpose or its goals. Recognizing an implied
cause of action against non-complying participating communities in either
the federal government or in private citizens would go a long way towards
achieving the NFIP's goal of preventing excessive flood damages, a goal
that has not yet been achieved in its nearly forty-year existence.
6 9 See supra notes 134-53 and accompanying text.
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